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INTRODUCTION

In an effort to encourage voting in the 2020 election, congresswoman
Alexandria Ocasio Cortez took to Twitch and broadcast herself playing Among
Us,1 a mafia-esque game, to almost 440,000 viewers.2 The congresswoman was
far from the first well-known person to broadcast, or stream, on the site however.
Drake has made appearances on stream;3 rapper T-Pain regularly broadcasts
himself playing video games and freestyling;4 and famous soccer player, Neymar,
recently began streaming on Twitch.5 Twitch has created celebrities, such as
Ninja and Shroud, who have inked exclusive streaming deals worth millions of
dollars in the past.6
Twitch, an Amazon subsidiary,7 has grown steadily since it began in 2011 and
is today a major player in the online-content marketplace.8 During the second
quarter of 2020, at the height of the coronavirus lockdown, Twitch had over 5
billion hours watched and averaged 2.4 million concurrent viewers.9 Even in
2014, Twitch represented almost 2% of all of the internet traffic in the United

1 Among Us is a video game played by six or more people. A majority of the players are
“crew members” who have to fix a spaceship before the “impostor(s),” kill all the crew
members. If one of the crew members is killed, the group will meet and try to identify who
the impostor is. The group will usually select one person and eject them from the spaceship.
The game continues until either the crew members correctly eject the impostor(s); fix the
spaceship; or the impostor(s) kill all of the crew members. Among Us, INNERSLOTH,
https://innersloth.com/gameAmongUs.php (last accessed Apr. 30, 2021).
2 Cecilia D’Anastasio, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Storms Twitch, WIRED (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/aoc-among-us-twitch-stream/.
3 Cady Lang, Leave It to Drake to Break the Internet by Playing a Video Game with a Star-Studded
Squad, TIME (Mar. 1, 2018), https://time.com/5201151/drake-fortnite-livestream/.
4 Steven Asarch, T-Pain Encourages Twitch Streamers to Use His New Beats with His ‘Blessing’,
NEWSWEEK (June 16, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/t-pain-encourages-twitchstreamers-use-his-new-beats-his-blessing-1511219.
5 Neymar da Silva Santos Júnior (@neymarjr), TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/neymarjr/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
6 Ninja and Shroud were initially paid to move to Microsoft’s streaming platform, Mixer,
and subsequently bought out of their contracts for a combined $40 million, $30 million and
10 million, respectively. Zak Wojnar, Ninja & Shroud Make $40 Million Combined from Mixer
Buyout in Just Months, SCREENRANT (June 22, 2020), https://screenrant.com/ninja-mixershroud-contract-40-million-shut-down/.
7 Eugene Kim, Amazon Buys Twitch for $970 Million in Cash, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2014),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-buys-twitch-2014-8.
8 Darren Geeter, Twitch Created a Business Around Watching Video Games – Here’s How Amazon
has Changed the Service Since Buying It in 2014, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/02/26/history-of-twitch-gaming-livestreaming-and-youtube.html.
9 Sarah Perez, Twitch Breaks Records Again in Q2, Topping 5B Total Hours Watched,
TECHCRUNCH (July 1, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/01/twitch-breaks-recordsagain-in-q2-topping-5b-total-hours-watched/.
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States and rivaled the primetime viewership of cable networks such as MTV,
Comedy Central, and CNN.10
Twitch, like other tech giants such as YouTube and Facebook, relies on usergenerated content to draw viewers to the site. 11 Twitch provides a platform for
people to broadcast live any type of content they wish.12 From video game
playthroughs and live concerts to political commentary, Twitch has something
for everyone.13 Unfortunately, Twitch’s platform can be abused by copyright
infringers and used to distribute infringing material to the masses, exposing
Twitch to extensive liability as a secondary infringer. Moreover, because Twitch
primarily focuses on video game streaming, streams inherently involve works
that are copyrighted by someone other than the streamer.14
Luckily for Twitch and other media-based websites, they can qualify for
statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and
avoid liability by cooperating with rightsholders to identify and remove infringing
content.15 For more than twenty years, the DMCA has protected the
rightsholders’ interests and allowed online service providers (OSPs) 16 to grow
into the massive companies that we know today.17
The DMCA has experienced some growing pains, however, as the OSPs have
grown in scale and scope.18 When the DMCA was passed, there was less content
to sift through, but today the proverbial haystack has grown exorbitantly, making
it much more onerous to identify and remove infringing content. 19
Rightsholders and OSPs alike are concerned with how the burden should be

Kim, supra note 7.
Id. (discussing how users stream unique content to viewers on Twitch similar to how
users upload content to YouTube or Facebook).
12 Tiffany Hsu, They Watched the Debate … on Twitch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020) (discussing
the different types of content available on Twitch), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/
30/business/media/twitch-trump-biden-debate.html.
13 Id. (discussing how 125,000 users tuned into one livestream to watch the first 2020
presidential debate).
14 See discussion infra Section II.a.1.
15 See discussion infra Section II.a.
16 See infra note 44.
17 See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 695, 712 (2011) (discussing how implementation of the DMCA facilitated the growth of
OSPs “who would not expand” without its protections) (citing S. R EP. NO. 105-190, at 8
(1998)).
18 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 9 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-fullreport.pdf (“[T]here are substantial questions over whether the current statutory framework is
adequate to address the sheer volume of copyrighted material online, some of it
unauthorized.”).
19 See id. at 9-11 (discussing how the increased scale of the internet has put pressure on
both rightsholders and OSPs under the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system).
10
11
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distributed and advocate for the DMCA to be amended to adapt to today’s
internet.20
In response, the Copyright Office undertook a study beginning in 2015 into
the DMCA’s alleged shortcomings and published its report along with suggested
amendments to the DMCA.21 Of particular concern to Twitch were the
proposed changes to the knowledge standard,22 which requires OSPs to act on
infringing content.23 The knowledge standard is an exception to the statutory
safe harbor of the DMCA that holds an OSP liable if it has actual knowledge or
“red flag” knowledge of infringing content.24 In its report, the Copyright office
suggests less stringent knowledge standards that would disrupt the balance
originally struck by the DMCA and potentially bring ruin on up-and-coming
websites like Twitch.25
In this Note, I will argue that Congress should avoid altering the knowledge
standard by demonstrating the inequitable effects such amendments would have
on OSPs like Twitch. Instead, Congress should focus on amendments that
address the DMCA’s growing pains more directly, particularly by providing
rightsholders the means to license the OSPs copyright detection technology.
I will begin by exploring the origins of the DMCA, the history of the common
law theories of secondary liability, and the Copyright Office’s proposed
amendments to the knowledge standard. Next, I will discuss how the proposed
changes to the knowledge standard would fundamentally change how Twitch
operates and devastate Twitch and other OSPs like it. Lastly, I will argue that
Congress should seek to amend the DMCA to allow for licensing of detection
technologies or provide rightsholders meaningful input into their development.
II. BACKGROUND
In hindsight, it seems painstakingly obvious to say that the internet has
exploded and evolved in unexpected ways. In the 1990s, however, Congress was
just beginning to grapple with the internet’s potential and the existential threat it

Id.
Id. at 1.
22 See discussion infra Section II.a.
23 Twitch employees frequently watch streams and are recognizable within a list of viewers
as employees. Twitch Badges Guide, TWITCH, https://help.twitch.tv/s/article/twitch-chat-bad
ges-guide?language=en_US (last visited Apr. 12, 2021). Presumably it would be easier for a
Plaintiff in a copyright infringement action to argue that Twitch had knowledge of the
infringing content if one of Twitch’s employees was watching the stream at the time,
particularly if the knowledge standard is lowered as proposed.
24 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). See discussion infra Section II.a.
25 See discussion infra Section II.c.
20
21
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posed to copyrights.26 Before the internet, it was difficult for infringers to
reproduce works on a commercially-viable scale without exposing themselves to
criminal liability.27 The internet effectively destroyed these limitations and
created new infringement opportunities that were previously inconceivable.28
The heightened potential for infringement was facilitated by OSPs whose
consumers used the OSPs’ websites or services to illegally reproduce and
distribute copyrighted material.29 While the OSPs themselves were not involved
in the reproduction or distribution of the works, courts in the early-to-mid 1990s
often held OSPs liable for the infringing activity of their users under two theories
of indirect liability.30 Courts extended contributory infringement and vicarious
liability from the physical space31 into the digital world32 and created a massive
amount of uncertainty for OSPs in the process.33
Both Congress and President Clinton recognized the need to adapt copyright
law to the digital age and address growing concerns about OSP liability,
culminating with the passing of the DMCA in 1998.34 Among the DMCA’s

26 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (recognizing that the internet makes copying and
distributing works easier).
27 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 18, at 14 (2020) (discussing how technological limits
“restricted the scale and quality of both reproduction and distribution”).
28 Id.
29 See id. (discussing how the internet facilitated copying and distribution of copyrighted
works). See also infra note 45 (defining “online service provider” more broadly than a website).
30 “OSPs were particularly concerned that they could be subject to direct, in addition to
indirect . . . forms of copyright infringement liability. Secondary liability doctrines enable
copyright owners to bring claims against third parties that have some relationship to persons
who themselves commit acts of infringement.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 18, at 15
n.49. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding the
Defendant directly liable even though he promptly removed the infringing content as soon as
he became aware and monitored the site to prevent future infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom Online Comm. Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing
contributory infringement claims against Netcom to proceed because there was a question of
material fact as to whether Netcom knew or should have known about the infringing activity);
and Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding the
operator of a bulletin board liable for contributory infringement where he actively solicited
users to upload unauthorized games).
31 Shapiro v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
32 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Comm’n Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp 1361 (N.D.
Ca. 1995).
33 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (“At the same time, without clarification of their
liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of
the speed and capacity of the Internet.”).
34 Compare id. at 8-9 (suggesting liability for OSPs should be limited to encourage
investment and stability) with BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE : THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 123-24 (1995) (favoring OSP
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provisions, Title II specifically addressed the uncertainty surrounding the
copyright infringement liability of OSPs.35 Instead of clarifying the doctrines of
contributory infringement and vicarious liability, Congress left the law in its
“evolving state” and sought to limit OSP liability by creating a series of “safe
harbors” for OSPs who meet certain statutory criteria.36 Congress felt it had
“appropriately balanced” the interests of OSPs, rightsholders, and internet
users.37 The DMCA maintained strong incentives for OSPs and rightsholders to
cooperate to detect infringing activity and provided more certainty to OSPs
about their potential copyright infringement liability.38 While Congress intended
for contributory infringement and vicarious infringement to complement the
safe harbors of 17 U.S.C. § 512, these doctrines heavily influenced the language
of the statute, particularly the language of § 512(c), and continue to have serious
interplay with the statute’s application.39
First, I will describe the four different safe harbors provided by Section 512
and discuss how Twitch fits into the statutory regime and maintains its safe
harbor status. Second, I will briefly discuss the history of the contributory
infringement and vicarious liability doctrines and how courts initially adapted the
doctrines to the digital age.
A. DMCA SAFE HARBORS AND TWITCH

When it was enacted in 1998, the DMCA created four safe harbors based on
the type of activity an OSP engages in.40 17 U.S.C. § 512 protects OSPs who (1)
engage in transitory digital network communications, 41 (2) cache information on
their systems,42 (3) have information residing on systems or networks at the
direction of users,43 or (4) refer or link users to an online location containing
infringing material, may qualify for protection if they meet the conditions set
forth in each subsection.44

driven solutions such as infringement detection and indemnification policies against users over
limitations on OSP liability), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED387135.pdf.
35 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19.
36 Id.
37 H.R REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998).
38 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2.
39 See id. at 44-45 (discussing the knowledge standard under the DMCA using common
law terms like actual knowledge and “red flag” knowledge).
40 Id. at 19.
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
42 See id. § 512(b) (defining caching as the “immediate and temporary storage of material
on the system of network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”).
43 Id. § 512(c).
44 Id. § 512(d).
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Before an OSP or company can qualify for safe harbor protection, however,
the OSP must meet the statutory definition of a “service provider.”45 The OSP
must also adapt and reasonably implement a policy for terminating a user’s
subscription and suspending that user’s access to the OSP’s system or network
“in appropriate circumstances.”46 Further, OSPs must take steps to inform their
users of the policy.47 Congress, however, did not intend the policy requirement
to impose a duty to investigate possible infringements, monitor its service, or act
as an arbiter determining whether the user’s conduct legally constitutes
infringement.48 The policy meant to put those users who “repeatedly and
flagrantly” use the service to “disrespect” the intellectual property rights of
others on notice that their access to the service or Internet, in general, may be
suspended.49
Further, the statute requires that the OSP accommodates and does not
interfere with “measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works.”50 The measures must be developed cooperatively between
OSPs and rightsholders in an open, fair, and voluntary manner. 51 The statute
requires that the measures be available to any person on reasonable terms and
without imposing substantial costs or burdens on OSPs. 52 The language here
encourages cooperation between the OSPs and the rightsholders in developing
tools, like the YouTube detection algorithm, to locate and remove infringing
content.53
Clearly lacking, however, is statutory language requiring the service provider
to unilaterally develop or improve technical measures to detect and prevent
infringement.54 Instead, Congress deferred to the industry to determine the best

45 Id. §512(k)(1)(B) defines “service provider” under all other subsections as “a provider
of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an
entity described in subparagraph (A).”17 U.S.C. §512(k)(1)(A) defines a “service provider”
specifically under subsection (a) as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing
of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a
user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as
sent or received.”
46 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
47 Id.
48 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998)
(discussing the policy requirement behind subsection (i) which was originally subsection (h)).
49 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998).
50 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(2).
51 See id. §512(i)(2)(A) (requiring that the policy be “developed pursuant to a broad
consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry
standards process”).
52 Id. §512(i)(2)(B)-(C).
53 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49.
54 17 U.S.C. §512(i).
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practices for preventing infringement.55 While the threat of liability may make
the bargaining power between rightsholders and OSPs seem unequal, each of the
safe harbors imposes specific activity-based duties and expectations that level the
playing field.56 The OSP’s duties vary under each subsection, but we need only
consider the subsections and duties that apply to Twitch.
1. Twitch’s Potential Copyright Liability and the DMCA’s Antidote
Twitch is a live streaming service operated by Twitch Interactive, a subsidiary
of Amazon.57 Livestreams on Twitch cater to many different audiences with
broadcasters (streamers) playing video games, improvising music, and providing
political commentary.58 After downloading screen capture software and signing
up for an account on Twitch, anyone can broadcast content around the globe
using Twitch’s website and servers.59 Viewers can tune into the channel (a web
page of the broadcast) where they usually see the broadcaster’s screen, a video
feed of the broadcaster’s face, and a chat window that they can use to interact
with other viewers.60 Throughout the stream, the broadcaster may run
advertisements, which generates revenue for both them and Twitch.61
The ease of setup and the potential to generate revenue or notoriety make
Twitch’s platform ripe for misuse. During the FIFA Club World Cup in January
2020, three different streams illegally broadcasted one match to over 100,000
total viewers.62 Unfortunately for Twitch this is not an anomaly,63 and as Twitch
has grown so has its potential copyright liability.64

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52.
The level of involvement on the part of the OSP generally determines its liability, rights,
and duties under the DMCA. For example, an internet service provider has different
obligations under the DMCA than a website like Twitch or YouTube. See generally 17 U.S.C. §
512 (defining the rights and duties of OSPs based on their activity).
57 Kim, supra note 7.
58 Hsu, supra note 12 (discussing how 125,000 users tuned into one livestream to watch
the first 2020 presidential debate).
59 Quick Start Guide, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/creatorcamp/en/twitch-musicgetting-started/music-on-twitch-quick-start-guide/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
60 Nick Wingfield, What’s Twitch? Gamers Know, and Amazon Is Spending $1 Billion on It, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/technology/amazon-nears-adeal-for-twitch.html.
61Id.
62 Cecilia D’Anatasio, Twitch Has Become a Haven for Live Sports Piracy, WIRED (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/twitch-sports-piracy-streaming/.
63 Id.
64 See Shannon Liao, Music is Big on Twitch. Now Record Labels Want It to Pay Up, CNN BUS.
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/14/tech/twitch-record-dmca-copyrightnotices/index.html (discussing Twitch’s potential liability for streamers playing unlicensed
music during a broadcast).
55
56
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Background music on streams has also caused some major copyright
headaches65 for Twitch.66 Like YouTube, Twitch initially resorted to taking
down recordings called Videos On Demand (VODs) or muting portions of the
VODs.67 More recently though, the crisis came to a head and Twitch forced
streamers to delete VODs with potential infringing content, resulting in most of
the recorded content being deleted from the website without an opportunity for
appeal by content creators. 68 Despite Twitch’s acquisition of some licenses for
a music library, tension remains,69 and Twitch continues to capitulate to
rightsholders.
The final copyright boss still looms on the horizon for Twitch, however, and
luckily, it’s still asleep. Most of Twitch’s content is centered around video games
that are themselves copyrighted works.70 While it may not be thought of
intuitively as infringement, broadcasting yourself playing a game can be illegal

65 Some headaches are more funny than they are painful. Recently, Metallica played at
BlizzCon, which was hosted virtually on Twitch. However, as the band started to play, the
live audio was muted and replaced with classical music because Twitch Gaming was worried
about receiving a DMCA complaint for playing Metallica’s copyrighted music. Chris Welch,
Some Viewers of Metallica’s BlizzCon Performance Heard the Least Metal Music Imaginable, THE VERGE
(Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/20/22292790/metallica-blizzcon-2021performance-dmca-for-whom-the-bell-tolls.
66 Id. (discussing Twitch’s difficulty in negotiating a licensing agreement with various
record labels and how the website has angered creators by forcefully removing content).
67 How to Appeal Muted Audio, TWITCH, https://help.twitch.tv/s/article/how-toappeal-flagged-content?language=en_US (last accessed Apr. 14, 2021); Paul Tassi, Twitch
DMCA Claims Frustrate Creators Forced to Delete Years of VODs and Clips, FORBES (Jun. 8, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2020/06/08/twitch-dmca-claims-frustratecreators-forced-to-delete-years-of-vods-and-clips/.
68 Jacob Kastrenakes, Twitch Will Begin Scanning and Deleting Clips that Contain Copyrighted
Music, THE VERGE (June 11, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/11/21288220
/twitch-scan-clips-copyrighted-music-dmca-takedowns-audible-magic.
69 Jon Blistein, Twitch Licenses Music Now. But the Music Industry Says It’s Skirting the Rules,
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/twitchsoundtrack-licensing-sync-1069411. A synchronization license (or synch license) grants the
right to synchronize the musical composition in timed relation with images or video. Types of
Copyright, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/licensing/entry/types_of_copyrights (last visited Mar.
27, 2021). This is a different license from a reproduction liceense, which allows the licensee
to make or store copies of the work. Id. Tension remains because rightsholders feel Twitch
should pay for the more expensive reproduction license rather than the sync license. See
Kastrenakes, supra note 67.
70 Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play: Anticipating the Problem of Copyright Infringement in the New
Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 52, 57-58 (2015). Video
game developers may also independently license popular music to play within the game and
separately license the original soundtrack to a game. See, e.g., The Music of Grand Theft Auto V,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_of_Grand_Theft_Auto_V (last visited
Mar. 27, 2021) (discussing the mix of licensed and original music included in Grand Theft
Auto V).
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copyright infringement.71 Fortunately, game developers typically license the
ability to stream their game whenever someone purchases it.72 Generally, this
practice is mutually beneficial for streamers, game developers, and Twitch
because the game gains popularity, sales increase, and the broadcast generates
revenue for Twitch and streamers.73
This licensing ecosystem functions well, but it is fragile. Game developers
are free at any time to change the terms of their end-user license agreement or
to revoke streaming privileges.74 Any change to the current licensing scheme
would be catastrophic for Twitch. For example, if Activision wanted to launch
its own streaming platform, it could prohibit people from streaming Call of Duty:
Warzone, on Twitch.75 While it’s unlikely that game developers would destabilize
the current licensing scheme, any changes to the DMCA’s safe harbors that give
rightsholders more leverage could prompt such a change. Fortunately, though,
the current Section 512 allows Twitch to avoid all forms of copyright liability and
thrive as a media outlet.
2. How Does Twitch Qualify for Section 512 Safe Harbor
While Twitch arguably fits into any one of the safe harbors listed in
subsections (a), (b), or (c), it most likely avoids liability under subsection (c). 76
Subsection (c) of Section 512 provides relief where infringing material is stored
on the OSP’s server or network at the direction of a user.77 Because streamers
initiate the broadcast and subsequent storage of video on Twitch’s servers, 78
Larkey, supra note 71, at 59-61.
Id. at 57-58.
73 Id. at 58.
74 Id. Although this is an evolving area in the context of videogames, it is generally
practiced by other large companies and generally accepted where the right to unilaterally
change the terms is reserved in the original contract. Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield,
They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of Change-or-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099,
1103-06 nn.12-16 (2010).
75 While this may seem unlikely, the same fate has already befallen Netflix and the market
for streaming TV shows and movies. See Julia Alexander, Streaming Was Part of the Future – Now
It’s the Only Future, THE VERGE (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/21536842/
streaming-disney-hbo-max-peacock-cbs-all-access-warnermedia-viacom-nbcuniversal
(discussing competition within the streaming space that was previous dominated by Netflix).
76 It could be argued that Twitch merely “transmits or routes” the streamer’s broadcast
through its servers to each viewer, qualifying it for safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
Alternatively, § 512(b) could apply if the broadcast data was stored temporarily on Twitch’s
server. Because Twitch makes recordings of the broadcast accessible for fourteen days, Twitch
is most likely to qualify for safe harbor under subsection (c). Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play:
Anticipating the Problem of Copyright Infringement in the New Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 52, 79-81 (2015).
77 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
78 Video on Demand, TWITCH, https://help.twitch.tv/s/article/video-on-demand?language
=en_US (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
71
72
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Twitch can qualify for safe harbor under subsection (c) as long as it meets the
statutory conditions.
In order to qualify for safe harbor under subsection (c), Twitch must have a
“designated agent” for receiving notifications of claimed infringement and
provide the agent’s contact information to the public.79 Like most large internet
media companies, Twitch provides its agent’s contact information along with
guidelines for submitting a DMCA notification.80 The notifications themselves
must meet certain statutory requirements that Twitch details on its DMCA
Guidelines page.81 Based on its DMCA policy, Twitch will qualify for safe harbor
under subsection (c) of Section 512 unless one of the exceptions in subsection
(c)(1)(A) applies.
While the elements of subsection (c)(1) are phrased as negative limitations,
each of the elements can be rephrased as a positive exception.82 Doing so makes
it easier to see how the statutory language mirrors the common law standards of
contributory infringement and vicarious liability, which Congress intended to
preserve under the DMCA.83
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) prevents the application of the safe harbor when
OSPs like Twitch have actual or “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity and
fail to timely remove or restrict access to the infringing content.84 Courts have,
traditionally, applied an almost identical test to hold defendants contributorily
liable for infringing activity.85
Additionally, OSPs may be held liable if they “receive a financial benefit
attributable to infringing activity” and have the “right and ability to control” the
activity.86 Once again, this standard maps almost directly onto the common law
standard used to hold defendants vicariously liable.87 Thus, it is beneficial to
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Notification Guidelines, TWITCH (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.twitch.tv/p/legal/dmca-guidelines. See also Rules and Policies: Copyright, YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/copyright (last visited Mar. 27, 2021)
(outlining YouTube’s copyright policy and directing visitors to a webform to submit a
notification).
81 Id. The notification must, among other things, (1) identify the copyrighted work claimed
to have been infringed, (2) identify the infringing material or subject of infringing activity that
is to be removed, (3) certify that the information is accurate, and (4) certify that the allegation
was made in good faith. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi).
82 The Senate and House reports also support this interpretation. See H.R. REP. NO. 105551, pt. 2, at 53-54; S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44-45 (1998) (describing the circumstances where
an OSP would lose protection).
83 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (“Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification
of these doctrines, the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state . . . .”).
84 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
85 See discussion infra Section II.b.2.
86 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(B).
87 See discussion infra Section II.b.1.
79
80
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understand the history and policies behind vicarious liability and contributory
infringement before those theories of indirect liability can be examined in the
context of the DMCA.
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIRECT THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Indirect theories of liability have been around much longer than the
internet.88 Contributory infringement and vicarious liability originate from tort
and agency law89 and were used to hold those who assisted, but did not personally
duplicate the copyrighted work, liable for infringement.90 The original
justifications behind these theories of liability is important to understanding how
the courts have shaped the doctrines to the digital world and shaped them under
the DMCA and Section 512.
1. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability was born out of the doctrine of respondeat superior and was
initially used to hold employers liable for the conduct of their employees. 91 The
doctrine has been extended into the online world to hold liable any defendant
OSP who has (1) the “right and ability to supervise” the direct infringer and (2)
an “obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted
materials.”92 In modern litigation, advertising revenue and sales data make it
easier to demonstrate that the defendant OSP received a financial benefit from
the infringing activity.93 While there are circumstances where the financial
benefit is unclear, most cases turn on the relationship between the defendant and
88 See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 996-1005
(2007) (discussing the origins of indirect theories of copyright liability during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries).
89 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][1]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021) (explaining how the doctrines of tort and agency law have shaped
what types of relationships and circumstances justifying holding a defendant liable).
90 Id. at 3.
91 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1366 (2004).
92 Shapiro v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
93 See A&M Recs. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing how
potential for user-derived revenue can support finding a financial interest where infringing
content draws users to the website or service); MGM Studios Inc., v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[D]irect financial benefit, via advertising revenue, [is] undisputed
in this case.”), rev’d, 545 U.S. 913 (reversing based on lack of substantial no infringing use)
(citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In earlier decisions,
courts were less willing to find a financial benefit where the defendant did not receive a more
direct financial benefit from the infringing content. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online
Commc’n Servs., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that attracting new
subscribers who generate potential advertisement revenue did not justify finding a direct
financial benefit).
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the direct infringer, particularly the amount of control exercised by the defendant
over the direct infringer.94
Characterization of the relationship between the defendant OSP and the
infringing user has proven to be a thorny endeavor for courts. In an early case
under the DMCA statutory regime, A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., the court held
Napster vicariously liable for the infringing conduct of its users because it failed
to police its system despite being able to locate infringing material.95 Napster’s
server created a searchable library that allowed users to search for and download
illegal copies of songs stored on another user’s computer.96 Because Napster
reserved the right to control access to its system, the Ninth Circuit required it to
exercise its policing power to remove detectable instances of infringement that
could be located using the search function.97 Ultimately, Napster failed to
adequately police its system, and the Ninth Circuit held it vicariously liable.98
Under the DMCA statutory regime, courts have started requiring something
more than the mere ability to locate or control content because the statute
requires OSPs to control content in order to qualify for safe harbor.99 For
instance, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the defendant, Cybernet, hosted
a network of websites and required the websites meet certain layout, appearance,
and image format criteria to become a member of the network.100 Because
Cybernet closely controlled the sites and actively policed them for compliance
with the network requirements, the court concluded that Cybernet had the right
and ability to control and could be held vicariously liable for infringing
content.101
Most of these cases turn on the defendant’s ability to “substantially influence”
or control the infringing activity but failing to exercise that control.102 Much like
the traditional principal-agent context, vicarious liability places potential liability
on the OSPs (the principal) because they usually are the least cost avoider and in

94 See Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (1996) (discussing the
amount of control the Cherry Auction exercised over the swap meet rules and the vendor
selling duplicated records).
95 239 F.3d 1004, 1024.
96 Id. at 1011-13.
97 Id. at 1023-24.
98 Id. at 1024. It was also shown in emails that Napster had actual knowledge of the
infringement. Id. at 1021-24.
99 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). By adhering to the
statute and issuing takedowns, OSPs would effectively concede that they have the requisite
control, rendering them vicariously liable for any infringing conduct of their users. Id.
100 213 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1173-74 (C.D. Cal.) (2004).
101 Id at 1174.
102 Id at 1173.
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the best position to stop the infringing activity.103 As discussed above, Congress
intended vicarious liability to continue to operate under the DMCA. 104 Because
OSPs are required to exercise control to qualify for the safe harbors, however, it
becomes difficult to determine when an OSP should be held liable under the
512(c)(1)(B) exceptions. 105
Knowledge of infringing activity or circumstances indicating ongoing
infringement would seemingly trigger liability because the OSP clearly failed to
exercise control over the user and prevent the infringement. Courts, however,
have not considered knowledge, actual or constructive, as “something more”
that will trigger vicarious liability.106 Knowledge has traditionally been
considered under the contributory infringement.107 Thus, in cases where
knowledge is present, courts will not predicate vicarious liability on actual
knowledge or constructive knowledge and instead turn to the contributory
infringement doctrine.108
2. Contributory Infringement
The theory of contributory infringement originated from the tort concept of
enterprise liability.109 In tort law, tortfeasors who contribute to a tortious act are
held jointly and severally liable with the primary tortfeasor.110 This serves to
disincentivize arm’s length participation in tortious conduct and ensure a full
recovery.111 The doctrine’s extension to copyright law was intended to serve the
same purposes by allowing plaintiffs to sue those who assisted “fly-by-night

103 Sverker K. Hogberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in
Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 915-16 (2006) (citing Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1280 n.142 (1984)).
104 See discussion supra Section II.
105 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012).
106 Id. at 38 (“[T]hese examples involve a service provider exerting substantial influence on
the activities of users, without . . . acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.”).
107 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][2]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021).
108 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
that “knowledge of the prevalence of infringing activity, and welcoming it, does not itself
forfeit the safe harbor. To forfeit that, the provider must influence or participate in the
infringement.”).
109 NIMMER, supra note 111, § 12.04[A][3].
110 Liability may be apportioned among two or more parties or to only one or a few select
members of the group of tortfeasors. Joint and Several Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).
111 See Nancy C. Marcus, Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the Attempted
Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60 ARK. L. REV. 437, 438-39 (2007) (discussing the policy
of ensuring a full recovery that is used to justify joint and several liability).
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record pirates” to ensure a fuller recovery and discourage participation in
infringement schemes.112
Contributory infringement is generally applied (1) where the defendant’s
personal conduct knowingly furthers the infringement and (2) where the
defendant provides the means of infringement with knowledge that the means
will be used to infringe copyrights.113 In most cases involving an OSP defendant,
or tech innovators in general, it can be readily shown that the OSP provided the
means of infringement because the OSP’s technology can be used in infringing
activity.114 Thus, the extent of the defendant OSP’s liability turns on whether
the defendant OSP had knowledge of the infringing use.
In order to hold a defendant liable, Courts require that the defendant have
actual knowledge of the infringing activity or reason to know infringement is
occurring, which is usually referred to as constructive or “red flag” knowledge.115
Typically actual knowledge turns on whether the defendant “actually or
‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement.” 116 Conversely, “red flag”
knowledge is charged when the defendant was “subjectively aware of facts that
would [make] the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable
person.” 117
Public policy has cautioned against finding requisite knowledge, however,
because potential copyright liability would suppress innovation, a paradigm that
the Supreme Court established in Sony v. Universal.118 In Sony, Universal wanted
to hold Sony liable under a theory of contributory infringement because
customers were using Sony’s Betamax video recorders to record Universal’s
television shows.119 Drawing on the idea that the Copyright Act of 1976
provides only statutory monopoly rights, the Court recognized that the 1976 Act
should be enforced to encourage and promote creative works.120 The Court held
that copyright should not allow rightsholders to condemn new technologies
merely because of their potential for infringement.121 Because Betamax was
capable of significant non-infringing uses, the Court held that Sony lacked

112 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][3][a]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021).
113 Id.
114 See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1984)
(demonstrating how the Betamax could be used to record television shows); Viacom Int’l, Inc.
v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (demonstrating how YouTube’s users could
upload infringing content to the site).
115 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
116 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31.
117 Id.
118 464 U.S. 417.
119 Id. at 419.
120 Id. at 439-42.
121 Id.
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constructive knowledge of the infringing use and did not hold Sony liable as a
contributory infringer.122
While the DMCA superseded the Court’s decision in Sony concerning OSPs,
the policies behind the decision heavily influenced the DMCA and are reflected
in its application.123 The Court in Sony recognized that copyright owners should
not weaponize their rights to prevent the development of new and useful
technologies.124 At the same time, rightsholders should still be able to enforce
their copyrights and hold innovators liable under a theory of contributory
infringement.125 The DMCA balanced the policies articulated in Sony by granting
safe harbors to OSPs while leaving room for contributory infringement to be
applied.126
Despite the statutory language of the DMCA, courts have struggled to
determine when there is sufficient knowledge to hold a defendant OSP liable.127
It has been particularly difficult to determine when “red flag” knowledge is
sufficient to impose affirmative duties to either take down content or inquire
further. In some cases, even actual knowledge of infringement was not enough
to impose liability.128
The doctrine of willful blindness compounds the problem by allowing
plaintiffs to impute knowledge to the OSP if it willfully avoided knowledge of
specific instances of infringement.129 Section 512 does not mention willful
blindness, but courts have applied the doctrine under the DMCA despite

122 Id. at 442-56. While the logic used to find potential for non-infringing use has been
questioned, the underlying policy reasoning remains sound today. See generally Thomas V.
Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1378-79 (2005)
(discussing how legislative monopoly rights have traditionally been used to further certain
public policies or objectives and suggesting caution in extending intellectual property rights
further than the legislature intended).
123 Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42 (discussing how copyright should not be used to
hinder the introduction of beneficial technologies) with S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (citing
Sony, 464 U.S. at 417) (discussing the intention of balancing copyright enforcement with the
introduction of socially beneficial technologies that may be used to facilitate infringement).
124 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (discussing balancing the exclusive copyrights with “the right
of others to freely engage” in commerce, such as developing new technologies and creating
new markets).
125 Id.
126 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 417); id. at 8-9 (discussing how
actual knowledge and red flag knowledge should be applied under the DMCA).
127 See generally John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of
Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1837-1840, 1847-48
(2013) (discussing how judicial application of the knowledge standard has changed over time).
128 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 119-21 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-fullreport.pdf.
129 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2012).
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lingering incongruencies.130 Courts have struggled, however, to strike a balance
between the affirmative duty imposed by the willful blindness doctrine to
investigate and Section 512(m). The lack of consistency suggests OSPs have no
affirmative investigative duties under Section 512.131 This has led to some
puzzling results.
In Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., emails from YouTube’s executives
indicated that they were aware that infringement was occurring on the site. 132
This included clips and full episodes of television shows and live sporting
events.133 The Second Circuit remanded the case to determine whether
YouTube had actual or “red flag” knowledge of infringing activity on its site or
whether YouTube was willfully blind.134 On remand, however, the District
Court held that, even though YouTube was generally aware of the infringement
on its site, YouTube could not be held liable because “specific locations of
infringements [were] not supplied.”135
Further, citing subsection(m) the District Court declined to impose any
affirmative duty on YouTube to search for the allegedly infringing materials
based on willful blindness.136 Drawing on the Second Circuit’s discussion, the
District Court held that 512(m) prevents imposing an affirmative duty to remove
infringing content, without specific knowledge of the infringing activity, such as
its location.137 Thus, OSPs could only be held liable if they are aware of “specific
and identifiable instances of infringement” and fail to investigate further or remove
the content.138
The result in Viacom may seem inequitable to rightsholders, but the
allegations should be given context. Even though the alleged material remained
on YouTube’s website, YouTube previously responded to more than 100,000
DMCA takedown requests from Viacom alone and quickly removed the
identified content.139 Moreover, at the time, almost twenty-four hours of video
130 See id. at 35 (reasoning that the statutory language, particularly the language in
subsection (m), does not preclude application of the willful blindness doctrine under the
DMCA).
131 Courts have not specifically addressed interplay between subsection(m) and the
language in 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(iii), which provides that “upon obtaining such knowledge
or awareness, [the OSP must] act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”
Although subsection(m) precludes imposition of any affirmative duties, the language in
subsection (c)(1)(A)(iii) seems, on its face, to impose an affirmative duty to restrict access to
infringing material only when the OSP has specific knowledge of the infringement.
132 676 F.3d 19, at 33-34.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 41-42.
135 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F.Supp. 2d 110, 115-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
136 Id. at 116.
137 Id.
138 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32.
139 YouTube, 940 F.Supp. 2d at 110.
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were uploaded to YouTube every minute.140 With such a large amount of data,
the District Court concluded that it would be inequitable to require YouTube to
find and remove the infringing clips without some indication of their location. 141
In the vacuum of litigation, where allegations of infringement are limited to
specific instances, it may seem incongruous to not hold the defendant OSP liable
when it is generally aware of the infringement. Moreover, evidence of actual or
“red flag” knowledge and the OSP’s ability to control its service seemingly justify
applying vicarious liability. These inconsistencies are a driving force behind the
push to reform the DMCA’s knowledge standard, and while they may seem like
Congressional oversights, they’re intentional.142
III. THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING: LOWERING THE KNOWLEDGE
STANDARD
Congress intended the DMCA to be a stepping off point from which
rightsholders and OSPs would embark on a cooperative venture to curb
copyright infringement on the internet.143 In the intervening decades, however,
it has become increasingly difficult to sift through days worth of data and root
out infringing content. 144 This difficulty has led to seemingly inequitable results
under the knowledge standard where the OSP has some ability to control content
and general knowledge that infringement is occurring but fails to remove the
illegal content.145
Accordingly, the Copyright Office has recommended that Congress consider
amending the DMCA’s knowledge standard to clarify the circumstances where
an OSP has failed its duties under the DMCA and should be held liable.146 These
amendments would shift the balance of the DMCA strongly in favor of
rightsholders in a way that would be devastating for OSPs like Twitch. Twitch,
in particular, would not be able to operate under the proposed changes and be
forced out of business, stifling the very creativity Copyright seeks to promote.

140 Id. at 114. Unsurprisingly, this number has continued to increase with almost 500 hours
of video uploaded to YouTube each minute in 2019. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 18, at
9-10.
141 See YouTube, 940 F.Supp. 2d at 114-15 (drawing on legislative history, the District Court
concluded that the DMCA was intended to prevent liability in situations where the OSP was
not specifically aware of the infringing material).
142 See discussion infra Section III.
143 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998).
144 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 10 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-fullreport.pdf.
145 Id. at 10-11.
146 Id. at 3-4.
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Application of the current knowledge standard may seem like a failure on
Congress’s part to lay out how the doctrines of secondary liability were meant to
interact with the DMCA. The courts, however, have correctly applied the
doctrines and not held the OSPs liable where there is only general knowledge of
infringement. The DMCA was intended to define the extent of the OSP’s duties,
specifically that there is no affirmative duty to search for and locate infringing
content.147 The language of the DMCA indicates that Congress believed
rightsholders were in the best position to identify the infringing content while
OSPs should remove that content. 148
Although these amendments would deter infringement and provide a more
defined standard for indirect liability in infringement actions, they would merely
treat a perceived symptom of the underlying problem. At the heart of the U.S.
Copyright Office’s report is the growing difficulty of locating and identifying
infringing content. 149 Both rightsholders and OSPs attribute the failure to one
another and want the other side to do more.150 Rather than crudely increasing
liability standards, Congress should pursue changes that will foster cooperation
between rightsholders and OSPs.
A. REFORMS PROPOSED BY THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE: A HARBINGER OF
THINGS TO COME

In this section, I will first discuss the proposed amendments to the DMCA’s
knowledge standard and how the Copyright Office suggests the changes should
function. Next, I will discuss how these changes would be catastrophic for OSPs
like Twitch and destabilize the balance of duties under the DMCA. Lastly, I will
demonstrate how the courts have correctly interpreted the knowledge standard
and suggest that the amendment should focus instead on balancing the burden
of locating infringing content.
At the end of a years-long effort, the Copyright Office published its official
report on the efficacy of the DMCA and recommended significant changes to
how knowledge of infringing activity should be considered by the courts. 151
More specifically, the report recommended (1) clarifying what constitutes
“something more” under the vicarious liability standard (2) clarifying the
distinction between actual and “red flag” knowledge, and (3) enlarging the scope
of the willful blindness standard.152 These proposed changes are intended to

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (precluding application of non-statutory affirmative duties).
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2.
149 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 148, at 9-12 (discussing the changes in the
technological landscape that led to the report).
150 Id. at 9-10; 28, n. 125; and 32, n.145.
151 Id. at 3-4.
152 Id.
147
148

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss2/6

20

Messick: Boss Battle: Twitch vs Proposed Amendments to the Knowledge Stand
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TWITCH VS PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

6/7/2021 7:22 PM

463

correct how courts apply the vicarious liability and contributory infringement
standards under the DMCA.153 The proposals, however, go too far and will
upset the balance of the DMCA, destroying its effectiveness and OSPs alike.
The Copyright Office first proposes removing the “something more”
requirement imposed by the courts applying vicarious liability and returning to a
more traditional common law standard.154 While the Copyright Office does not
suggest significantly expanding the standard, 155 it does suggest that the standard
being applied now is not stringent enough and does not adequately capture noncompliant OSPs.156 In turn, the Copyright Office recommends that something
more than a general level of control be required to hold a defendant OSP
liable.157 The report gestures to early common law standards where contracts
and close relationships formed the basis for vicarious liability, suggesting that the
DMCA should apply a similar standard.158 Predicating liability based on a
contractual or close relationship with end-users would be disastrous for Twitch.
While users do not have to register for a Twitch account to watch a broadcast,
they must have an account that is subject to Twitch’s terms of service before
they can begin streaming.159 As clearly stated in the first sentence of the terms,
“THIS IS A BINDING CONTRACT.”160 Like most OSPs, Twitch enters into
a contract with its users where users are granted access or provided a service in
exchange for a promise to abide by the OSP’s guidelines. 161 Among the
agreement’s provisions, “Twitch reserves the right to remove, screen, or edit”
any content uploaded to Twitch.162
A more common-law-like standard would require courts to apply a standard
similar to the one applied in earlier cases like Napster.163 As discussed above, the
Ninth Circuit held that reserving the right to remove or edit content and failing
to exercise that right was sufficient to hold Napster liable under a theory of
vicarious liability.164

153 Id. at 124-27 (discussing how increasing clarity of what the law is and predictability is a
goal of these amendments).
154 See id. at 135 (discussing how the common law standard should be applied, but the
requisite level of control should be contextualized for OSPs).
155 Id. at 136.
156 See id. at 135 (“The Office is unconvinced that Congress . . . intended to abrogate the
common law standard for right and ability to control to require ‘something more.’”).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Terms of Service, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/p/legal/terms-of-service/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2021).
160 Id.
161 Id. § 1 (“Introduction; Your Agreement to these Terms of Service”).
162 Id. § 9 (“Prohibited Conduct”).
163 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
164 Id.; see discussion supra Section II.b.1.
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Thus, under the proposed amendments, Twitch could be held liable in any
instance where it fails to remove infringing content because it reserves the right
to remove content. Like Napster, Twitch has a search function and access to
data that can be used to locate infringing streams.165 Further, Twitch is
undeniably aware that infringement occurs on its site.166 While the infringing
streams may not represent a majority of the content on Twitch, general
knowledge of infringement favors holding Twitch liable because it indicates a
failure to exercise the right to police its website.167
Returning to such a common-law standard would greatly increase Twitch’s
potential liability and force it to preemptively take down content. Even in cases
where the content in question may not be considered legally infringing under the
doctrine of fair use, a lower standard of vicarious liability would effectively force
Twitch to remove it or face liability. With less streaming content available on
the site and “views”, Twitch’s revenues from ads and subscriptions would
decrease.168 Additionally, Twitch’s reputation as a content provider would be
tarnished,169 further decreasing its traffic and correlated revenues.
The Copyright Office also proposes reconsidering the courts’ definitions of
actual and “red flag” knowledge and lowering the knowledge requirements for
showing willful blindness.170 While the report considers these amendments
separately, the knowledge standard has serious interplay with the willful
blindness doctrine. Raising or lowering the “red flag” or constructive knowledge
standards will inherently affect when affirmative duties apply under willful
blindness and form a basis of liability if the OSP fails to investigate.

165 Noreen T. M., Find What You Want Faster With Updated Search, TWITCH (June 9, 2016),
https://blog.twitch.tv/en/2016/06/09/find-what-you-want-faster-with-updated-searchb33121645ad6/#:~:text=Whether%20you%20want%20to%20find,of%20results%20in%20
each%20category.
166 See discussion supra Section II.a.2 (discussing how Twitch seeks protection under the
DMCA and is therefore regularly notified about infringing streams or videos that are present
on its website).
167 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (“Turning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for
the sake of profit gives rise to liability.”).
168 See Nick Wingfield, What’s Twitch? Gamers Know, and Amazon Is Spending $1 Billion on It,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25 2014) (discussing how unique genres of content like video games
generate
revenue
for
Twitch
based
on
viewership),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/technology/amazon-nears-a-deal-for-twitch.html.
169 Recent news coverage of Twitch issuing vague takedown notices has not been favorable
to Twitch, a trend that would presumably continue under a wave of preemptive takedowns.
Nicole Carpenter, Twitch Streamers Were Issued Tons of DMCA Takedown Notices Today, POLYGON
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.polygon.com/2020/10/20/21525587/twitch-dmca-takedownnotice-content.
170 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 110 (2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-fullreport.pdf.
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The Copyright Office takes issue with how courts have declined to apply
affirmative duties where an OSP is aware that infringement is occurring on its
website generally but has not received a takedown request.171 The Copyright
Office suggests that section 512(m) cannot be read to shield OSPs from
additional non-statutory, affirmative duties.172 The Copyright Office concludes
that there must be “some circumstances” where, absent a takedown notification,
an OSP has a duty to investigate further and potentially remove content. 173
Consequently, a failure to investigate further or avoiding knowledge would
violate the lower willful blindness standard suggested by the Copyright Office.
The report opines that the subjective actual knowledge standard and
objective “red flag” knowledge standards, as defined in Viacom, have failed to
capture these circumstances and let OSPs off the hook.174 To remedy this, the
Copyright Office proposes defining “red flag” knowledge on a case-by-case basis
using an OSP’s relevant characteristics, such as size and filtering technologies. 175
In turn, proportional affirmative duties could be circumstantially applied to the
OSPs.
First, courts already take the OSPs’ characteristics, such as size and filtering
technologies, into account when applying the actual and “red flag” knowledge
standards.176 For example, in Viacom, the Second Circuit emphasized the amount
of data uploaded and the difficulty of locating the infringing content when it
discussed YouTube’s general knowledge of infringement.177 Likewise, in Napster,
the Ninth Circuit specifically discussed how Napster knew that illegal copies of
songs were regularly uploaded to its website and could easily locate them using
its own search function.178
Regardless, defining the knowledge standard on a case-by-case basis reinjects
the very uncertainty the DMCA was intended to remove back into the copyright
regime. For Twitch specifically, it would be difficult to gauge how a particular
court would consider its growing size, new detection technologies, its policies,
or other factors because Twitch’s characteristics and capabilities change

Id. at 111 n.591, 122-124.
Id. at 111 n.591.
173 Id. at 111-12 n.591.
174 Id. at 122-123 (“Such a narrow interpretation of red flag knowledge minimizes an OSP’s
duty to act upon information of infringement and, in doing so, protects activities that Congress
did not intend to protect.”).
175 See id. at 123-124 (proposing that the OSP’s “relevant characteristics” should be taken
into account when determining the appropriate red flag standard, which will naturally change
between cases).
176 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32-34 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the
size of YouTube and the amount of content uploaded when deciding whether to hold that
YouTube had knowledge).
177 Id. at 28, 31.
178 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
171
172

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 6
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

466

6/7/2021 7:22 PM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 28:2

rapidly.179 Such a standard creates a much larger potential liability, and Twitch
would, once again, be forced to preemptively remove content that might not be
considered infringing by the courts. As discussed above, removing more content
than necessary or banning streamers to avoid liability would cripple Twitch’s
revenue and reputation in the marketplace.180
Likewise, if liability can be applied under the willful blindness doctrine based
on general knowledge of infringement, Twitch would have to invest significant
resources into rooting out potentially infringing content. Twitch would need to
hire a team of employees to investigate instances of infringement and invest
significant resources to develop better detection means. If one stream slipped
through where a copyrighted video was shown, Twitch could be held liable.
Extra policing may not directly affect Twitch’s revenue, but it would certainly
increase its costs and presumably cause some reputational damage for improperly
removing content.
Alternatively, sites like Twitch could stop seeking safe harbor under the
DMCA and Section 512 altogether.181 The amended statute would not provide
additional protection, so Twitch would have no reason to continue responding
to takedown requests from rightsholders. In fact, Twitch would have no
incentive to put more than a minimal detection algorithm in place or continue
cooperating with rightsholders.
These predictions may seem apocalyptic, but Twitch has already begun
preemptively removing content in response to pressure from the record
companies.182 It stands to reason that increasing Twitch’s potential liability is
only going to exasperate the situation and encourage video game developers to
enter the fray by revoking the ability to stream their game in hopes of getting a
cut of the revenue. Other larger OSPs may be able to survive under the proposed
amendments, but up-and-coming OSPs like Twitch will be lost, and the next
Twitch or Twitter may never be created.

179 Darren Geeter, Twitch Created a Business Around Watching Video Games – Here’s How
Amazon has Changed the Service Since Buying It in 2014, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019) (discussing how
Twitch
has
grown
rapidly
since
2011
and
continues
to
grow),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02
/26/history-of-twitch-gaming-livestreaming-andyoutube.html.
180 Music-Related Copyright Claims and Twitch, TWITCH: BLOG (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://blog.twitch.tv/en/2020/11/11/music-related-copyright-claims-and-twitch
(addressing growing frustrations from streamers about Twitch’s shift in DMCA policy).
181 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 10 (2020) (discussing how other OSPs have threatened to stop complying with
the DMCA), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf .
182 See Music-Related Copyright Claims and Twitch, supra note 176 (“[R]ight now your only
options, if you think [the clips] contain unauthorized music, is to either go through them one
by one, or, for Clips, use the ‘delete all’ tool we’ve provided.”).
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B. “THERE’S A SECOND STAGE”: SENATOR TILLIS’S PROPOSED REFORMS TAKE
THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE’S SUGGESTIONS TO A NEW LEVEL

While the proposed changes are not law yet, Senator Tom Tillis recently
drafted reforms to the DMCA that lower the knowledge requirement for OSPs
to take advantage of safe harbors. 183 Specifically, Senator Tillis defines “red flag”
knowledge very generally as, “facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is likely.”184 This definition goes even further than the Copyright Office
suggestion and would hold OSPs liable whenever they have general knowledge
of infringement. Further, Senator Tillis’s draft legislation supports application
of a duty to investigate based on general knowledge of infringement. 185
These changes would make the proposed nightmare a reality. While “facts
and circumstances from which infringing activity is likely” could be narrowly
interpreted by the courts to mean “specific knowledge,” it is unlikely because
“apparent” has been changed to “likely,” suggesting a lower standard. 186 Twitch
could presumably be held liable if it had any indication that infringement might
be occurring on its site. Thus, if an employee happened to be watching a stream
and encountered potentially infringing content,187 Twitch may be held liable
under Senator Tillis’s proposal.
Senator Tillis does propose that the Register of Copyright establish
reasonable best practices for OSPs based on their size and type of service every
five years, which may alleviate some potential liability if OSPs follow the
procedures mandated by the Register.188 There is no guarantee, however, that
these procedures will catch all the facts and circumstances which indicate
infringement may be occurring.189 Thus, Senator Tillis’s draft does exactly what
183 Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
THOM TILLIS, U.S. SENATOR FOR NORTH CAROLINA (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillis-releases-landmark-discussion-draft-to-reformthe-digital-millennium-copyright-act.
184 Discussion Draft for Stakeholder Comments Only, THOM TILLIS, U.S. SENATOR FOR NORTH
CAROLINA 2 (Dec. 18, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/
97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB-6A745015C14B.
185 See id. (adding language in 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)(2)(B)(ii) to ensure willful blindness will
be applied if the OSP fails to act on facts or circumstances that indicate infringement is
occurring).
186 Compare id. with 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
187 See discussion supra note 22.
188 See Discussion Draft for Stakeholder Comments Only, supra note 180, at 3. Establishing
“reasonable best practices” alone would not severely burden Twitch compared to a change in
the knowledge standard. While I would certainly like to see my solution adopted, this proposal
is a good solution because it uses a third-party government agency to delineate the duties of
OSPs and rightsholders under the DMCA, which addresses the problem rather than merely
shifting the burden to OSPs.
189 Senator Tillis proposes having the user verify that they are authorized to upload the
content, either as the owner or through a license. Id. It’s highly unlikely that this would do
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the Copyright Office proposes. It shifts the burden of uncovering infringing
content to OSPs, which has the potential to destroy Twitch and other OSPs if it
becomes law.190
IV. COOPERATIVE PLAY: CONGRESS SHOULD SEEK TO FOSTER
COOPERATION BETWEEN OSPS AND RIGHTSHOLDERS
A. HIGH BAR FOR INDIRECT LIABILITY: BUG OR FEATURE?

The problem with applying secondary liability theories is not the statutory
language of the DMCA or the standards themselves. Indeed, the standards are
functioning as Congress intended. The duties imposed under the DMCA were
intended to be a high-water mark for duties that could be imposed by courts
because OSPs would be unable to develop and thrive without significant liability
protection.191 The policies first laid out in Sony and subsequently codified in the
DMCA favor protecting OSPs as a default because of the value they represent,
especially to copyright.
Every broadcast on Twitch is a copyrightable work that stimulates creativity
and online culture across the world, not just the United States. While there
certainly is some infringement on the site, it represents a small portion of the
content on Twitch overall. Increasing Twitch’s liability and forcing it to
preemptively remove content may protect some copyrighted works from
infringement, but it will hinder the creation of copyrightable works overall. A
small shift in the knowledge standard would allow current rightsholders to stifle
other creators even if the copyrighted work is not legally infringed.
The perceived unfairness that results when applying the vicarious liability and
contributory infringement standards under the DMCA remains, however. This
is largely because the traditional concepts of knowledge and control do not
translate to the scale of the internet. For example, before the internet, applying
a secondary theory of liability might have held a movie theatre liable for showing
a pirated copy of a movie or a flea market operator for leasing space to someone
known to sell counterfeit records.192 It was relatively easy to demonstrate that
the owner or operator of the premises knew about the infringement or should
have known due to some unusual circumstance. In either case, it seems equitable
to then place a burden or duty on the owner to stop the infringer before the
anything as users already agree not to upload content that they do not own. See Terms of Service,
supra note 156.
190 The draft does not distribute any additional burden to rightsholders. Tillis Releases
Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 183.
191 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8-9, 21 (1998) (limiting copyright liability so that OSPs can
develop rather than be crushed by the uncertainty of copyright liability).
192 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A][2]-[3]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021).
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rightsholder could be harmed any further. The infringer is readily identifiable
and kicking the vendor to the proverbial curb or destroying a pirated copy is not
a difficult task. If the owner or operator failed to take action, liability should be
extended to the owner because her failure to act caused the rightsholder further
injury.
Imagine now that the flea market had a million booths or that the theatre
showed hundreds of thousands of movies at once. While the owner in those
situations may be aware that infringement is occurring somewhere on the
premises, it becomes exponentially more difficult for her to identify and stop the
movie or remove the vendor. Placing a burden or duty on the owner in such a
situation would be extremely inequitable because it is not clear she could have
done anything to prevent the infringement. In such a situation, even if the owner
had the means to quickly stop the infringement activity, the owner would need
to have more specific knowledge about the infringement before the court would
impose a duty.
Obviously, no such flea market or movie theatre exists let alone precedent
that comprehends such a situation, but OSPs are essentially digital versions of
incomprehensibly large movie theatres or record stores. In Viacom, the Second
Circuit recognized the amount of data that YouTube would have to comb
through with only limited knowledge of the work that was allegedly being
infringed.193 The Second Circuit correctly recognized this problem as well when
it declined to impose an affirmative duty on YouTube.194 Even absent the
language of subsection (m), the Second Circuit could have drawn on common
law principles to decide not to hold YouTube liable. Instead, the court assumed
that Congress considered the imposition of any affirmative duties in such
situations when it included subsection (m), preventing affirmative duties from
being applied under the DMCA.195
The language may seem ripe with oversight, but it functions as Congress
intended. By securing cooperation from OSPs, rightsholders would be able to
police infringing content (a duty of the rightsholder) through DMCA takedown
requests. The OSPs, in turn, would remove the content and adjudicate any
subsequent appeals from the user who uploaded the content in the first place.
In exchange, the OSPs are granted protection from claims of indirect
infringement absent some circumstance where the OSP knowingly permits
infringement to continue, which is consistent with the common law doctrines.
In effect, the DMCA acts as a high-water mark for OSP liability, delineating
the few circumstances where an OSP should be held liable. The DMCA was

Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012).
See id. at 34-35 (discussing how the DMCA does not permit application of a duty to
monitor). This is equitable, especially in relation to YouTube, which at the time had twentyfour hours of video uploaded every minute. Id. at 28.
195 Id. at 34-35.
193
194
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designed to provide a solid foundation for OSPs to build on and certainty that,
as long as they cooperated with rightsholders in good faith, they would not face
liability.196 Twenty years later, it is clear that the DMCA has served its purpose
and facilitated growth for OSPs while protecting the interests of rightsholders.
It’s time, however, to address the growing pains.
B. TREATING THE DISEASE, NOT THE SYMPTOM

Results under the knowledge standard are a flare-up of the rising tension
between OSPs and rightsholders. The DMCA has equipped both sides with
tools to facilitate the removal of infringing content without antagonistic demand
letters and courtroom battles. It has not, however, provided a means to
determine who is responsible or in the best position to locate the infringing
content on the OSPs’ networks or websites.
Traditionally, rightsholders have borne the burden of identifying the
infringement and bringing the counterfeiters and those complicit in the scheme
to court to recover damages.197 In the online world though, rightsholders must
invest significantly to protect their works. Of course, large companies and
organizations like the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) have the
resources to do so, but smaller creators, like Twitch streamers, simply cannot
police the entire internet on their own.198
Conveniently, OSPs provide an excellent scapegoat that is capable of bearing
such a burden. Under the traditional theories of vicarious liability and
contributory infringement, OSPs represent the least-cost avoider.199 They are
the most familiar with their technology and in the best position to assist and
protect rightsholders. Placing the entire burden on OSPs, however, would be an
unprecedented shift in copyright law and could place potentially ruinous costs
on them. Likewise, shifting liability onto OSPs, as the Copyright Office
recommends in the lowering of the knowledge standard, will only inflame the
situation and cause it to deteriorate further. Congress should instead require

196 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (explaining that an OSP which expeditiously responds to a
takedown notice and does not have knowledge of infringement cannot be held liable for
copyright infringement).
197 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 12-14 (2020) (discussing how rightsholders have traditionally pursued infringers
independently), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf.
198 See Id. at 10-11 (discussing how large companies and organizations outsource detection
while smaller creators have difficulty policing infringement of their works online).
199 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (“In such cases,
as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the
‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others
and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.”).
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OSPs to provide rightsholders access to their Application Programming
Interfaces (“APIs”) and back-end storage.
C. EXPANDING RIGHTSHOLDER’S ACCESS TO OSPS’ DETECTION TOOLS

Providing rightsholders access to the OSPs’ APIs and back-end storage
would hand over the OSPs’ unique abilities to sift through or sort content to the
rightsholders. Moreover, it is entirely consistent with the DMCA regime as it
stands currently under subsection (i)(2). With carefully crafted legislation
Congress can protect OSP trade secrets and determine the types of access that
should be afforded to rightsholders. In the event there is a disagreement,
Congress can provide for closed arbitration and terms under which disputes
should be settled. In the end, rightsholders would have all the tools necessary to
locate the infringing content and report it to the OSP with a DMCA takedown
requests.
Currently, rightsholders may create tools for detecting infringing content and
ask (or demand) that the OSPs add them to their networks and website.200 There
is no guarantee, however, that the detection system will work effectively or will
continue to work as OSPs change and update their systems. Moreover, there is
no incentive for OSPs to facilitate detection tools because it could lead to more
potential liability by increasing the OSP’s knowledge of content on the site.
Thus, rightsholders are left using the DMCA’s tools to encourage the OSP to
curb infringement. It would be more effective to give the rightsholders the
information they need to develop better detection mechanisms, but under the
current regime, OSPs have no incentive to give it to them.
To facilitate the sharing of APIs and back-end storage solutions, Congress
should be prepared to offer OSPs an almost unconditional safe harbor in
exchange for participation. The only exceptions being for bad faith dealing,
failure to provide some required piece of technology, or situations where the
OSP is willfully blind to specific instances of infringement, similar to the current
case law. This would greatly incentivize the OSPs to cooperate and enter into
agreements with the rightsholders.
The terms of the agreements should include some statutory minimums and
create positions within the OSPs organization and the rightsholders organization
to spearhead communication between the two. For example, the terms of the
agreement should at least provide information on how content is stored on the
site or network. In Twitch’s case, an agreement might include how Twitch stores
and organizes VODs on its servers or even how streams are encoded and
broadcast to viewers. In turn, a rightsholder, a record label for instance, could

200 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (requiring OSPs to accommodate and not interfere with
“standard technical measures,” i.e. detection methods).
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use that information to develop an algorithm to sift through VODs or streams
and flag videos more reliably.
Most importantly, the parties should agree on what content should be
removed. One of the greatest dangers of the DMCA is the removal of content
that is not legally infringing. Under a new statutory regime, the parties should be
required to draw the line themselves. While it might be difficult for the two sides
to agree initially, the certainty provided would be beneficial for not only the OSPs
and rightsholders but also for the content creators and users of the website.
Users who upload content would be incentivized to avoid infringing content
because they would be detected more easily and singled out for liability. Thus,
the primary infringers have a higher likelihood of having their access to the
website or the internet revoked and potential copyright liability.
In the event negotiations break down, Congress should provide for
mandatory arbitration to dictate the terms of the agreement.201 This would
ensure that the parties can reach an agreement and participate in the new regime.
Moreover, the threat of arbitration after the parties have agreed in principle
would incentivize them to reach an agreement during negotiation without a
formal proceeding.
Lastly, Congress should provide for penalties against the rightsholders for
improper disclosures of the OSPs’ APIs or back-end storage. OSPs are
protective of their trade secrets and disclosure of an important algorithm or API
would be extremely detrimental.202 Therefore, the amendments to the DMCA
should include a statutory penalty or right of action against the rightsholder if
the information is negligently handled or improperly disclosed. The agreement
between the parties or even the amendments to the DMCA may contemplate the
necessary protections taken by the rightsholder, and the OSPs may negotiate for
additional protections if they wish.
The amendments proposed in this Note would preserve the original spirit of
the DMCA. The original act sought to foster cooperation among OSPs and

201 For example, Congress could provide for a mandatory licensing system like the system
provided for in the Music Modernization Act. See Music Modernization - Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/faq.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2021).
202 Section 1(4) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as information
that: “(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by . . . , other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (emphasis added).
Technology companies increasingly hide . . . algorithms and business models behind the shield
of trade secret protection.” Marietje Schaake, Trade Secrets Shouldn’t Shield Tech Companies’
Algorithms
from
Oversight,
BROOKINGS: TECH STREAM (May
4,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/trade-secrets-shouldnt-shield-tech-companiesalgorithms-from-oversight/.
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rightsholders to remove infringing content. 203 The proposed exchange of APIs
and back-end storage information extends this idea and cooperation into
detecting the infringing content, which is almost impossible for either side on its
own. The exchange offers even more certainty to both parties and content
creators online. Most importantly, the amendments remedy the disease that has
infected the knowledge standard by facilitating the discovery of knowledge,
which neither party wants to do under the current standard.
V. GAME OVER: A HAPPY END FOR TWITCH
For Twitch, trading API and back-end storage information to avoid liability
would be a dream come true. Currently, Twitch is in a pickle trying to negotiate
licenses from rightsholders, remove infringing content, and keep its users happy.
An agreement under the amendments proposed above would solve all of
Twitch’s problems at once. The need for licenses would be more acute than the
general license Twitch is currently attempting to negotiate because Twitch could
more readily determine what types of licenses it requires.204 Twitch would also
have to spend less time identifying content to remove and simply remove the
content identified under the agreement. Lastly, streamers would be able to avoid
infringing activity and disciplinary action from Twitch without having to guess
whether their stream violates the community DMCA guidelines.
Rightsholders would also benefit. By giving the information to rightsholders,
such as ESPN or record labels, Twitch would enable those companies to identify
streams to be taken down more readily. For instance, the agreement might
include an API that allows the rightsholders to monitor streams as they pass
through Twitch’s servers. This would allow illegal streams to be taken down
quickly and pre-empt injury to the rightsholders. Additionally, it would be easier
to detect repeat offenders and permanently ban them.
These amendments further the cooperative spirit of the DMCA and treat the
cause of the DMCA’s growing pains without the uncertainty or crudely shifting
liability in hopes that the courts will figure it out the second time. Thus, Congress
should protect Twitch and its peers as well as rightsholders by drafting legislation
that provides for the licensing of detection tools as outlined above. In this
sequel, Congress would be the hero who once again brought peace to the land,
allowing Twitch, rightsholders, and content creators to prosper together.

S. REP. NO. 105-90, at 20 (1998).
As a subsidiary of Amazon, Twitch has many opportunities to meet this need and real
negotiating power to make the deals happen. Kim, supra note 7.
203
204
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